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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the implications of economic crises on real estate markets
in Latin America using a new database on real estate prices from seven countries in the
region. In the first chapter it is found that after a crisis begins, the Price Earnings Ratio
(PER) of real estate increases significantly relative to stocks and sovereign bonds. This
result implies that during times of instability investors are willing to pay a price premium
for holding real estate instead of stocks and sovereign bonds. The argument behind this
empirical finding is that during these crises there is a capital flight towards real estate
due to a higher resiliency perceived by investors on this asset class. The second chapter
develops a theoretical asset-pricing model that uses the notion of resiliency to economic
disasters to explain the empirical observation of a widening in the gap between the PER
of resilient (real estate) and non-resilient (stocks, bonds) assets during crises. The model
was calibrated using data on real estate, stocks and sovereign bonds from Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay. The calibrated model was able to match the risk premium of each asset class
and predict correctly the heterogeneous evolution of the asset’s PER after an increase in
the probability of disaster.
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CHAPTER 1: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
INSTABILITY ON REAL ESTATE
1. Introduction
How do investors reallocate their savings after an economic crisis begins in a country
where confidence in sovereign bonds (hereafter called bonds), banks and stocks is lost?
What is the impact of crises on the price of assets considered to be safer? How much would
investors pay for holding these safer assets during instability? The present paper argues that
in some Latin American countries, when confidence in sovereign bonds, stocks and banks
is lost, investors perceive real estate as a safer asset in terms of higher resiliency of their
prices with respect to market conditions. Because of this, after an economic disaster, there
is a capital flight to real estate that generates an increase in the price paid for holding real
estate compared to riskier assets like bonds and stocks. This price premium was measured
in the present paper as the difference between the Price Earnings Ratio (PER) of safer
real estate and riskier assets like bonds and stocks. The PER represents the price paid
per dollar of annual earnings obtained from an asset. This concept is very familiar when
referring to stocks, and a very similar reasoning can be applied to real estate and bonds.
For real estate, the PER is the price paid per dollar that was earned from rent, and for
bonds is the price paid per dollar that came from bond payments (reciprocal of the bond
yield). It was found in the data that after an economic crisis investors are willing to pay
a significantly higher price per dollar of annual earnings for holding real estate instead of
stocks or bonds.
In this paper three events were used to identify the effect of instability on real estate
PER: the 1990-1994 crisis in Brazil, the 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina and the 2002-2003
crisis in Uruguay.
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The 2001 crisis in Argentina was not only an economic crisis but also political and
institutional. During the first eleven months of 2001 the country had three different Minis-
ters of Economy and during the last month of 2001 four different Presidents. In December
2001 Argentina defaulted its sovereign debt and implemented capital controls in order to
prevent a capital flight to foreign countries. Withdrawals were limited to 1,000 US dollars
per month per account for one year, Central Bank authorization was required for wire
transfers, and in January 2002 the fixed exchange rate was drastically abandoned (Auguste
et al., 2006). On February 2002 the government decreed the asymmetric pesoization of
bank balance sheets, which converted all dollar deposits into pesos at a rate imposed by
the government (IMF, 2002). The main causes of the crisis were argued to be the fixed
exchange rate maintained by the country since 1991, the weak fiscal policy that generated
significant budget deficits, and adverse external shocks. Stiglitz (2002) suggests the main
reason was pegging the peso to the dollar, since most of the foreign trade was made with
countries like Brazil and Europe where the currency was depreciating, and this generated
a massive trade deficit.
According to Ferreira and Bonomo (2006), after 1985 the Brazilian government suf-
fered a progressive deterioration in the fiscal situation, relying on unannounced reductions
in the indexed inflation compensation on its debt, which represented an implicit default
on domestically held debt. Stagnation and inflation were the main features of the period
1987-1993, as it is explained in Baer (2008). On march 1990 the country reached a monthly
inflation rate of 81% and the government implemented a new anti-inflation program know
as Collor Plan, which included several reforms such as: replacement of the existing currency
and adoption of a floating exchange rate; freezing of 80% of all private accounts exceeding
1300 US$ for 18 months (receiving the prevailing rate of inflation plus 6% in interest while
frozen); a very high tax on all financial transactions; and a temporary freeze of wages and
prices among other changes. The plan, which represented an implicit default on domesti-
cally held debt, succeeded in bringing down inflation for a short time period, however the
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government was unable to reduce spending and the government’s fiscal situation deterio-
rated again. Sovereign debt was restructured under the Brady deal in 1992 but this did
not prevent inflation to accelerate again in 1993. The deposit freeze introduced in march
1990 lasted 18 months and affected two thirds of the total money supply (M4). Individuals
and companies were allowed to withdraw up to a limit of 1,000 US dollars per month from
their savings or demand deposits. Beginning in September 1991, these frozen deposits were
released in 12 monthly installments (Moody’s, 2008).
De la Plaza and Sirtaine (2005) claimed that the financial system in Uruguay was highly
dependent on Argentina’s economy. Two of the largest banks in Uruguay were owned
by Argentinean groups and were exposed to risk in this last country. When Argentina
implemented capital controls in December 2001, these two banks faced a run on deposits.
By February 2002 the Central Bank of Uruguay was forced to suspend the operations
on one of these banks, and later on they had to abandon the fixed exchange rate due
to the large reduction in their foreign reserves. The government injected money in the
financial system nationalizing some banks and buying stocks on other banks in order to
recapitalize them. After a 5-day banking holiday in July 2002, the US dollar time deposits
on public banks were reprogrammed with extensions on their maturities from one to three
years, representing a de facto deposit freeze. Finally, in may 2003 the government had to
restructured its debt eliminating any financial need until 2005.
During these crises in Latin American countries there is a widespread mistrust in tra-
ditional financial assets like stocks and sovereign bonds, and since real estate assets are
considered to be a safer alternative, capital flies to the real estate market. In this sense,
Auguste, Bebczuk and Moya (2011) suggest that instability and violation of financial prop-
erty rights in Argentina have increased demand for real estate as an investment. Also
Bebczuk and Garegnani (2012) used an Equilibrium Correction model to provide evidence
that supports the idea that real estate fulfills a prominent role as a financial investment in
Argentina, particularly in times when investors lose confidence in the banking system. The
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present paper will test the idea that after an economic disaster occurs in a country with
recent generalized violation of property rights such as sovereign debt defaults or deposit
freezes, there is a flight to quality phenomenon that increases the gap between the PER of
real estate and stocks/bonds.
The methodology used is Difference-in-Differences, which consists basically on compar-
ing the PER of real estate versus stocks and bonds before and after the crisis happens.
The treatment group in this framework is represented by real estate assets and the control
group by stocks and bonds.
The conclusion is that the gap between the PER of real estate and stocks/bonds in-
creases after an economic disaster occurs in a country where investors lost confidence in
traditional financial assets like stocks and sovereign bonds. This means that after an eco-
nomic crisis investors are willing to pay a price premium for holding real estate instead of
riskier assets. More precisely, the estimations obtained in this paper suggest that after the
crisis investors paid more than double the price (in terms of annual earnings) for holding
real estate compared to stocks and bonds. In other words, investors resigned to half the
asset’s annual earnings in exchange of having safer real estate instead of stocks/bonds.
In order to check the robustness of the results, estimations were carried out using
alternative definitions of stocks PER and bonds PER. Levered and unlevered stocks PER
were computed and the results of the estimations were similar, also stripped yields and
non-stripped bond yields were used and results did not change significantly. Moreover,
placebo tests were conducted and they showed that crises were the relevant event behind
the significant changes in the asset’s PER.
There are other papers in the literature that also studied real estate markets in Latin
American from an empirical perspective, but none of them is focused on the safer asset
feature of real estate and the consequences of large economic crisis on their prices. For ex-
ample, Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Hassler (2001) use loan-level data to empirically assess
the impact of the currency devaluation on prepayment and default patterns of residential
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mortgages in Argentina. Martins, Lundberg, Takeda (2011) investigated the recent evo-
lution of the mortgage market in Brazil. They asked whether the current expansion in
mortgage lending is the result of institutional and macroeconomic improvements favoring
economic stability. Sagner (2009) use a sample of 419 houses to determine the main factors
behind the evolution of house prices in Chile during the period 1990-2007. Parrado, Cox,
Fuenzalida (2009) claim that the growth in house prices during the period 2001-2007 has
been correlated with an increase in household income and a decrease in mortgage interest
rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the description
of the data used in the paper and the methodology used to construct the PER of each kind
of asset. Section 3 introduces the empirical model used for the evaluation. In Section 4
results are shown and in section 5 several robustness checks were implemented in order to
check the reliability of these results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Data
2.1 Real Estate Prices
In order to construct PER of real estate, first it was necessary to obtain an annual series
of prices per square meter for each country during the analyzed period. The available data
on real estate in developing countries is scarce, and very hard to obtain for periods that are
20 years away in the past. Currently there is no public information on real estate prices on
a historical basis, and the database used for this paper is the first one that has comparable
prices on real estate among seven countries in Latin America for the period 1991-2008.
The sample period, the frequency of the data (annual) and the countries included were
determined by data availability. Data on real estate prices from other comparable countries
could not be obtained. One important feature shared by countries included in the sample
is that they are all developing countries that have experienced sovereign defaults and/or
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deposit freezes in the past, generating a subsequent lost of confidence in the traditional
financial sector.
The first real estate price index for Argentina was obtained from the Economic Institute
of UADE University, which collected offer prices of apartments located in the north side of
Buenos Aires City posted in newspaper advertisements. This index corresponds to average
monthly prices in dollars, and they were transformed to annual average prices assuming
a base value for the index, which was obtained from market data. The reason why this
monthly data was converted to annual data was to be able to compare it with all the rest of
the real estate prices series for other countries, which were usually obtained in an a annual
basis. Other two series were obtained from one of the largest real estate agencies in the
country; one of them is referred to real estate properties located in a neighborhood called
Caballito, and the other one referred to real estate in the neighborhood Recoleta. The
series were expressed in annual average prices in dollars per square meter.
Two real estate price series for Brazil were obtained from Empresa Brasileira de Estudos
de Patrimonio (EMBRAESP). One of them corresponds to Metropolitan Area of Sa˜o Paulo
and the other one to a broader area called Municipio de Sa˜o Paulo. Both series were
expressed in annual average prices per square meter in dollars.
In Uruguay, the National Statistics Institute of Uruguay (INE) provided a series of
annual average transaction prices in dollars per square meter of dwellings in Montevideo,
for the period 1999-2008. This data was available for different neighborhoods, and three of
the most populars were used in the evaluation. In order to cover the period 1991-2008 two
series obtained from two different real estate consulting firms in Montevideo were linked.
In Chile, two real estate price series were taken from Parrado, Cox and Fuenzalida
(2009). They represent the quarterly median of transaction prices of houses at N˜un˜oa
and Santiago districts in the period 2001-2007. Prices were measured in “Unidades de
Fomento” (UF), and were converted into dollars using the corresponding exchange rate.
Another two series were obtained from a publication called “Portal Inmobiliario”, which
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correspond N˜un˜oa and Santiago for the period 2005-2008. Those last two were used to
extend the first two series until 2008.
In Colombia, three real estate price indexes were obtained from the National Depart-
ment of Statistics (DANE) for the period 1998-2008. These three indexes are quarterly and
correspond to averages of real estate offer prices in pesos at three different areas: Bogota´,
Cali and Colombia. These indexes were converted into dollars using the exchange rates
provided by the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la Repu´blica de Colombia). Another
group of three annual series for these areas was obtained from Banco de la Republica for
the period 1991-1998, and were used to extend the real estate price series until 1991.
Real estate prices in Mexico were obtained by a large real estate agency in the country.
The series obtained represent annual averages of prices in pesos per square meter for new
apartments offered in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. From Bank of Mexico we
obtained the series of exchange rates at the end of each year, which was used to convert
the average prices in pesos to dollars.
In Venezuela, real estate prices were also obtained from a large real estate agency. The
series correspond to average annual prices in dollars per square meter of apartments located
in the metropolitan area of Caracas.
Some important limitations of the data obtained on real estate prices is that they
belong to metropolitan areas and most of it constitute offer prices (not transaction prices).
Moreover, since real estate indexes were constructed as an average of offer prices, they do
not reflect possible changes in the quality of the units sold nor changes in the neighborhoods
were most of the houses were sold. In order to adjust for these changes in quality it would
be necessary to obtain data on all the prices at which each single unit was sold throughout
the sample period, along with its main characteristics and improvements, and use that to
construct a Case-Shiller index. Unfortunately, as it was mentioned before, real estate data
is very scarce in these countries and such information is not available.
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2.2 Rental Prices
The second piece of data needed to construct a Price Earnings Ratio for real estate
is the earnings or rental prices. Fortunately, the information on these indexes is usually
available since one of the components of the Consumer Price Index is the expenditures on
dwelling rent. Indexes on rental prices were provided by national institutions of statistics
in each country.
In Argentina the index was obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC)
and corresponds to the district of Gran Buenos Aires, in Colombia from the National De-
partment of Statistics (DANE) corresponding to Bogota´, in Chile from National Institute of
Statistics (INE) corresponding to Santiago, in Mexico from Banco de Mexico corresponding
to the metropolitan area of Mexico City, in Brazil from the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE) corresponding to Sa˜o Paulo, in Uruguay from National Institute of
Statistics (INE) corresponding to a national index, and in Venezuela from Central Bank of
Venezuela (BCV) corresponding to the metropolitan area of Caracas.
For Argentina there was a monthly rental price index in pesos for the whole period,
which was converted into dollar prices at each month, using market data for the base year
and the corresponding exchange rates at the end of each month. The same methodology
was used for the rest of the countries.
The limitation of the data in this aspect is that it is not possible to construct series of
rental prices for each neighborhood for which we have real estate prices, because there is
not rental prices data specific to different neighborhoods. Consequently the same series of
rental prices was used to construct the series of real estate PER in different neighborhoods
within a country.
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2.3 Bonds
The PER for bonds in all the countries studied in this paper were constructed from
the yield to maturity of the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) of
each country.
The EMBIG index begins in 1993 for Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, and in 1994 for
Brazil. These countries have also a very similar index for the rest of the years until 1991,
the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), which was used to extend the series until 1991.
Most of these countries offered some kind of collateral (usually US Treasury Bonds) to
their bonds at some point in the sample period, and JP Morgan also computes the yields of
their Bonds after subtracting the value of the collateral, so as the yields can be comparable
across time and across countries. This is called stripped yield, and is the one that was used
in the evaluation analysis. The non-stripped yield was also used as a robustness check.
2.4 Stocks
The PER for stocks was computed using the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL database. This
database is composed of data on non-US public firms, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico. Uruguay does not have enough public firms data so the
stocks PER for this country was not computed.
The first problem when computing PER for a set of firms within a country is that
firm’s earnings may be negative or close to zero, so taking the average of firms PER would
generate an excessive influence of cases with small earnings, resulting in misleading results.
In order to avoid this problem an approach similar to the one suggested in Welch (2009)
was followed. It consisted on computing the sum of the firm’s market capitalizations and
dividing this by the sum of the earnings of these firms. Then, stocks PER for each quarter
were constructed as the ratio of the sum of the firm’s market capitalizations at the last day of
the quarter, over the sum of the earnings of these firms during the last four quarters. When
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data on quarterly earnings was not available annual data was used for all the quarters in
the corresponding year. Finally the annual average stocks PER was obtained by computing
the average of quarterly PER.
One problem with the described way of computing the PER for stocks is that they are
based on past earnings and because of that they are backward-looking. An alternative
to this approach is to use forward-looking stocks PER computed by I/B/E/S Thomson
Reuters, which are based on financial analysts forecasts on the Earnings Per Share of each
firm. As a robustness check, the analysis was also implemented replacing the COMPUSTAT
PER with the I/B/E/S PER.
Another issue to take into account when computing stocks PER is leverage (debt-to-
equity ratio), since firm’s PER usually decrease as they raise their leverage. In order to get
rid of the effects of leverage and be able to compare firms with different levels of leverage
analysts usually compute unlevered PER. The formula used to compute unlevered PER is
the following (Leibowitz, 2002):
Unlevered PERi =
MarketV aluei,t/(1− Debti,tDebti,t+Equityi,t )∑4
j=1(Earningsi,t−j + InterestExpensei,t−j)
(1)
where i represents the firm and t the quarter.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the PER for real estate, stocks and bonds
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Figures 1.1 to 1.7 in the appendix show the plots of the PER for real estate, stocks and
bonds in each country for the sample period. For Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay the graphs
show that after the beginning of the crisis (year 2002, 1991 and 2002 respectively) the real
estate PER increase significantly relative to stocks and bonds. Figures 1.4 to 1.7 show
that for countries that were not on crisis during the sample period there are no significant
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increases in the gap between PER of real estate, stocks and bonds.
3. Empirical Model
The dependent variable in the main regression is the PER for stocks, bonds and real
estate. The idea is to capture the effect of the crises on the real estate PER compared to
stocks and bonds. The estimated empirical model is based on the Difference-in-Differences
approach and is the following:
PERi,t,a = α + β1(Treated ∗ After)i,t,a + β2Treateda + β3Afteri,t + δi + ηt
+θa + γ
′χi,t + ui,t,a (2)
where i denotes the country, t denotes time (year) and a represents the three asset classes
(real estate, stocks and bonds), PER is the price earnings ratio of real estate, stocks and
bonds, Treated is a dummy variable that takes value one for the treatment group (real
estate), After is a dummy variable that takes value one for the period after treatment (i.e.
crisis), Treated ∗ After is the interaction of the two previous variables. The variables δi,
ηt and θa capture the country, year, and asset class fixed effects respectively. χ represents
a vector of time-variant country level controls like GDP growth. The coefficient of interest
is β1, which represents the Difference-in-Differences estimator of the impact of the crisis on
real estate PER.
The increase in risk perceived by investors during an economic disaster and the loss of
confidence in assets like sovereign bonds and bank deposits, are considered in this paper to
be the drivers of a flight to quality towards real estate. Because of this, the after treatment
period was set to start the year in which there is a large decline in GDP and a sovereign
default or deposit freeze.
In Argentina the after treatment period was set to start in 2002, since that year reg-
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istered the highest fall in GDP per capita (12%), a sovereign default was declared in late
December 2001, and a deposit freeze was also implemented in that month. The same cri-
teria was followed in Uruguay, where the fall in GDP per capita reached 11% in 2002, and
also was that year when the Uruguayan government froze deposits. Moreover, the evalua-
tion exercise was also done setting the after treatment period to start in 2001 (instead of
2002) for Argentina and Uruguay, allowing for a possible anticipation of the crisis, and the
results obtained were very similar.
In March 1990 the Brazilian government froze all liquid assets for 18 months, including
bank deposits and sovereign bonds, paying interest rates well below market rates (Ferreira,
Bonomo 2006). Since there is no available information for 1990, the after treatment period
was set to start in 1991 for Brazil.
Brazil and Argentina both imposed controls on capital outflows, which decreases the
probability of capitals flying abroad. However, even without such restrictions it is likely
that a big portion of local investors, probably the smaller and less sophisticated ones, keep
their capital inside the country due to lack of knowledge about the options of investing
abroad or in order to avoid financial advising and operational fees.
The treatment group is real estate and the control group is composed by stocks and
bonds. The treatment consists of an economic disaster (large fall in GDP) coupled with the
confidence crisis in banks and sovereign bonds generated by deposit freezes and sovereign
defaults. As it was mentioned previously, in the case of Brazil the treatment period starts
in 1991 and for Argentina and Uruguay begins in 2002, the rest of the countries remained
untreated for the whole sample period.
In order to obtain causal effects, it is important for this identification strategy that the
economic disasters in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are exogenous to the real estate and
securities markets. This assumption would not be realistic for a crisis such as the 2008
in US, where the stock market collapsed basically due to a decrease in the value of real
estate and its impact on mortgage-backed securities. However, the assumption is reasonable
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for these three Latin American countries, where both mortgage and securities market are
abysmally smaller, even relative to the size of these economies and where disasters were
mainly generated by a process of fiscal imbalances. As shown in figure 1.8, the Value of
the Stocks Traded relative to the GDP was very small during the crises in Argentina and
Brazil. Moreover, in these countries the housing mortgage lending has been historically
below 8% of GDP (Martins et al. 2011, Auguste et al. 2011), compared to a rate close to
90% for US before the beginning of the 2008-2009 crisis.
4. Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 1.2 shows the results of a Difference-in-Differences analysis using model (2) with-
out any control variable. The fact that no controls were used implies results in this table
are unconditional. Results conditional on the asset class, country and other factors are
obtained in table 1.3.
The top panel (treated) in table 1.2 compares the mean PER of the treatment group
(real estate) during crisis and non-crisis periods. The crisis (or treatment) period is 2002-
2005 for Argentina and Uruguay and 1991-1994 for Brazil. The duration of the treatment
in the table was set to four years, following the results obtained in a table 1.4 (explained
later on in this paper), which shows that the effect lasted five years in Argentina, four
in Brazil and three years in Uruguay. Three and five year crisis durations were also used
obtaining similar results. The middle panel (control) in the table compares the mean PER
of the control group (stocks and bonds) during crisis and non-crisis periods. The bottom
panel (difference) shows the differences between the first two rows. Standard deviations of
the means appear below each mean as well as the number of observations used to compute
them.
The most important result of table 1.2 is the Difference-in-differences estimator, which
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is 11.22 and is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level. This means
that during a crisis investors pay on average 11 more dollars per dollar of annual earnings
for holding a safer asset like real estate instead of stocks and bonds. By comparing the
treatment and control PER it can be said that during a crisis investors pay on average
more than double the price (in term of earnings) for holding real estate compared to what
they pay for the othet assets. Another way to read this finding is that investors are willing
to resign half the annual earnings of a risky asset in exchange of holding real estate instead
of stocks or bonds.
Some disadvantages of table 1.2 are that estimations are not being controlled for other
factors that may be driving the increase of real estate PER, and also that the timing with
which the crisis affect these assets cannot be identified. In order to control for factors like
country, time, asset-class fixed effects, and to analyze the lagged effect of the crisis on a
year-by-year basis the following model was estimated,
PERi,t,a = α + β1(Treateda ∗ Aftert) + β2(Treateda ∗ Aftert−1) +
β3(Treateda ∗ Aftert−2) + β4(Treateda ∗ Aftert−3) +
β5(Treateda ∗ Aftert−4) + β6(Treateda ∗ Aftert−5) + β7Treateda +
β8Aftert + β9Aftert−1 + β10Aftert−2 + β11Aftert−3 +
β12Aftert−4 + β13Aftert−5 + ηt + θa + γ′χi,t + ui,t,a
(3)
where Aftert represents the first year of the after-treatment period (1991 for Brazil and
2002 for Argentina and Uruguay), Aftert−1 the second year, etc. The rest of the variables
were defined in section 3.
Results of the estimation of this model and some variants are shown on table 1.3.
The dependent variable is the PER of all three kinds of assets: Real Estate PER, Bonds
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PER and Stocks PER. The six different columns represent six different specifications that
incorporate different sets of controls. The fist column shows the result of a regression
without controls. The second column shows the results with asset class fixed effects, which
means that a dummy variable for stocks and a dummy variable for bonds were incorporated
in the model. The third column shows the results with country fixed effects, the fourth
column incorporates year fixed effects. The fifth column shows the results controlling for
GDP growth in each country. Finally, the last column incorporates the lagged effects of
the treatment as well as all previously mentioned controls.
It was found that the effect of the crisis on real estate PER is positive and statistically
significant, being the estimated coefficient in the range of 7.8 and 10.3. These findings
are consistent to what was found in table 1.2 and show that the result is not driven by
country-specific, year-specific or asset-class-specific effects. Moreover, the table shows that
the effect of the crisis on real estate PER persists on average for four years after the first
year of the crisis, and is decreasing in magnitude during this period.
4.2 Real Estate Prices and Earnings
The main result so far is that after an economic crisis the gap between the PER of real
estate and stock/bonds gets wider. However it is also relevant to ask what is driving real
estate PER upwards. Is the reason a change in real estate prices or in rental prices? In
this section this questions is addressed.
Figures 1.9 to 1.11 show the percentage change of real estate prices (numerator of PER)
and rental prices (denominator of PER) for the countries that suffered an economic disaster.
It can be observed that the reason why real estate PER increase during a crisis is that the
negative change in the earnings component is grater than the negative change in prices in
absolute value.
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4.3 Institutions, Mutual Funds and Foreign Investors
Do institutions played a significant role in the flight to quality phenomenon? What kind
of investors were behind the increase in the real estate PER gap? Where they mutual funds,
local investors or foreign investors? This section addresses these questions, analyzing the
participation of Central Banks, National Governments, Mutual Funds and foreign investors.
Institutions such as the National Government and the Central Bank played a key role
in flights to quality phenomena, mainly because they are responsible of providing investors
confidence in the financial system. In Argentina, since 1991 to 2001, the value of the peso
was pegged to the dollar under a currency board arrangement, but this was terminated
with a set of new regulations imposed by the National Government during December 2001
to March 2002. These measures included a bank deposit freeze, sovereign default, capi-
tal controls to wire capital abroad, controls on exports proceeds (forced to be repatriated
and sold in the foreign exchange market within 6 months), sudden increase in the export
duty rates, drastic devaluation of the local currency (peso), and the implementation of an
exchange rate arrangement classified by the IMF (AREAER Report, 2003) as managed
floating with no preannounced path (Central Bank influences the movements of the ex-
change rate through active intervention without precommitting to a preannounced path
for the exchange rate). The main objective of these measures was to prevent a larger de-
valuation of the peso. Also within the end of year 2001 the country changed its President
several times. All these events eroded the confidence in local investments, making investors
willing to protect their assets against possible expropriations and devaluations of the peso.
Real Estate in this economy has been traditionally traded in US dollars and did not ex-
perience expropriation events for a long time, thus providing a way to be hedged against
devaluations and violation of property rights. However, buying real estate was not the only
strategy investors followed to protect their assets. Auguste et al. (2002) provided evidence
that more sophisticated investors were willing to pay high costs to legally move their funds
16
abroad by buying American Depositary Receipts. In Brazil, the beginnings of the 1990’s
were also characterized by a number of government measures and economic conditions
that eroded the confidence of investors in local investments. In order to fight against the
prevailing inflation the government changed their local currency multiple times, and froze
prices, government liabilities and all bank deposits generating great losses to investors. In
Uruguay, before 2002 the economy was performing well and institutions like the National
Government and Central Bank were strong. However, the financial system in Uruguay was
highly dependent on Argentina, and the crisis was due to a contagion from the instability
started in Argentina.
Did mutual funds play an important role in the flight to quality towards real estate?
There is not much publicly available information on the holdings of mutual funds for that
period in Latin America, however in Argentina they were subject to strong regulations and
this made possible to obtain an idea of the importance of this kind of investors on real
estate markets. The most important mutual funds in Argentina were called AFJP’s, which
were privatized pension funds. These mutual funds were subject to many restrictions
with respect of the type of instruments where they could invest their capital, and were
monitored to keep a portfolio with low levels of risk. The most important assets in the
AFJP’s portfolio were local sovereign bonds. According to Ferro (2008), during 2002-2005
the AFJP’s investment in local sovereign debt account for 65%-78% of their funds, the
second asset class in order of importance is local firms stocks and bonds with an average
weight close to 10%. The importance of sovereign debt from foreign countries increased
during the period 2001-2005. The weight of time deposits was relatively stable at values
close to 5%. All other investments (including mortgage credits, available funds, options and
futures contracts) account for at most 5% of total assets in the period after the beginning
of the crisis, being this percentage smaller in the pre-crisis period. Franceschini (2001)
claims that the only way the AFJP’s had to increase demand for real estate was through
securitization of mortgage credits, which allowed real estate buyers to get lower interest
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rates. However, the importance of this instrument in the AFJP’s was marginal. Based on
this evidence, mutual funds do not seem to have been a significant factor in the Argentinean
flight to quality phenomenon.
Did foreign investors play a significant role in the flight to quality towards real estate?
Despite the fact that local investments were not very attractive in a country with weak
institutions, expropriation events, political turmoil, and economic crisis, it could be the case
that some foreign investors would want to invest in local real estate, a relatively safe asset
within the economy. The nationality of the real estate buyers during the crisis constitutes
information that is not publicly available, but the amount of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) can be checked in order to have an idea of the importance of foreign investors in
this context. This information on FDI was obtained from the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In figure 1.12 it can be observed that during the
crisis period FDI decrease in Argentina (2002-2005), and stay relatively stable in Brazil
(1991-1994) and Uruguay (2002-2005). Alternatively, figure 1.13 takes into account the
different sizes of these economies and shows the importance of FDI relative to the GDP for
each year. Based on this information, there is no evidence of a significant participation of
foreign investors in the flight to quality phenomenon that increased the relative prices of
real estate in the region.
5. Robustness Checks
5.1 Separate regressions for each country
Table 1.4 presents the results of running regressions similar to those in last column of
table 1.3 but separately for each of the countries that suffered an economic disaster. The
estimated model is the following:
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PERt,a = α + β1(Treateda ∗ Aftert) + β2(Treateda ∗ Aftert−1) +
β3(Treateda ∗ Aftert−2) + β4(Treateda ∗ Aftert−3) +
β5(Treateda ∗ Aftert−4) + β6Treateda + β7Aftert +
+β8Aftert−1 + β9Aftert−2 + β10Aftert−3 +
β11Aftert−4 + ut,a (4)
where variables were defined in section 3.
The fact that coefficients on the treatment variables are positive and significant shows
that the results obtained for the aggregate of countries in tables 1.2 and 1.3 are not driven
by one single country. The results are significant for all the three crisis countries included
in the sample.
Another interesting result in table 1.4 is that the effect of the crisis on real estate PER
persisted during five years after the beginning of the crisis in Argentina but only during four
years in Brazil and three years in Uruguay. Following this last result, the after treatment
period in table 1.2 was set to four years.
5.2 Placebo Tests
In order to rule out the possibility that the increase in real estate PER have also occurred
in years where there was no crisis, in this section a set of placebo tests are presented.
Placebo tests are a way of check weather the effect of the crisis is a key driver of the
increase in real estate PER or not. The procedure consists in simulating that the crisis
occurred in a year different than when it actually happened and perform the previous tests
under this placebo event. If the effect of the crisis is real, it should be observed that
the estimators associated to the variables indicating an unreal event are not significantly
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different from zero.
Table 1.5 shows the results of running regressions similar to table 1.4, for each of
the three treated countries. The difference with table 1.4 is that here every coefficient
corresponds to a different regression, where the rest of the coefficients are not shown for
simplicity. The coefficient placed in the first column and first row of the table is the
Difference-in-Differences estimator for the placebo (unreal) event occurred at year 1991 in
Argentina. As it can be observed the coefficient is not significantly different from zero,
which is consistent with the idea of being 1991 a placebo and 2002-2006 the real crisis
period. The coefficient on the second row of the first column shows the result of using
year 1992 as a placebo. For all non-crisis years a placebo test was implemented in all three
countries finding that none of this placebos were significantly different from zero.
Since there were not enough available information on stocks and bond markets for
Uruguay prior to 2001, estimators were not computed for these years.
5.3 Alternatives ways of computing stocks and bonds PER
The analysis until here was based on backward-looking stocks PER. In other words, to
construct stocks PER, the value of earnings corresponds to past earnings. An alternative
measure is forward-looking stocks PER, which uses analyst’s forecasts on future Earnings
Per Share (EPS).
Table 1.6 show the results of doing the same regression as table 1.3 but using forward-
looking stocks PER instead of backward-looking ones. As it can be observed in the table,
results are very similar to those in table 1.3. The effect of the crisis on real estate PER
is positive and significant, showing similar coefficients as the ones found using backward-
looking stocks PER.
Another issue to consider at the time of computing stocks PER is leverage, since stocks
PER are usually decreasing in leverage, analysts usually unlevered the stocks PER before
comparing different firms or time periods with different leverage levels. Table 1.7 presents
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the results of performing the same regression as in table 1.3 but using unlevered PER in
order to get rid of the possible changes in stocks PER due to different leverage levels.
Results are similar to those obtained in table 1.3 suggesting that previous findings are
robust to alternative ways of computing stocks PER.
As regards sovereign bonds, there would be also more than one way of computing PER.
Most of the countries in the sample offered some kind of collateral to their bonds in the
past and analysts compute the yields of these bonds after subtracting the value of the
collateral, so as the yields can be comparable across time and across different countries.
This is called stripped yield, and is the approach used to compute bonds PER in all the
previously shown tables. As a robustness check table 1.8 shows the results of running the
same regression as in table 1.3 but using non-stripped bond yields. Results are consistent
to those obtained in table 1.3, suggesting that previous findings are robust to alternative
ways of computing bonds PER.
6. Conclusion
This article provides empirical support for the idea that in countries that have expe-
rienced economic crises with events of violation of financial property rights like sovereign
defaults or deposit freezes, real estate assets are perceived as more resilient compared to
stocks and sovereign bonds.
The main finding is that real estate presents significantly higher PER after the begin-
ning of a crisis, compared with alternative investments. This implies that during times
of instability investors are willing to pay a price premium for holding real estate. The
estimations obtained in this paper suggest that during the crisis investors paid more than
double the price (in terms of annual earnings) for holding real estate instead of stocks
and sovereign bonds. It was also shown that this difference in the PER persists from 3
to 5 years, depending on the country. These results were obtained by implementing a
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Difference-in-Differences approach, using real estate prices from seven different countries
in Latin America.
The argument behind this finding is that during crises there is a capital flight towards
real estate due to a higher resiliency perceived by investors on this asset class.
One limitation of this paper consists in the kind of data that was obtained on real estate
prices. They constitute annual averages and they were not adjusted by improvements or
differences in the quality of the properties that could have happened over the sample
period. It would be interesting to obtain disaggregated data on real estate prices and
characteristics, which would permit to construct a Case-Shiller Repeated Sales Index, and
evaluate the effect of the crises on this quality-adjusted price index. However, it is not
likely that the significant differences in the PER obtained in this paper were driven by
generalized changes in quality since these PER differences appear only after the beginning
of a crisis and vanish a couple of years later.
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7. Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for Price Earnings Ratios
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Argentina
PER Caballito 8.548 3.17 5.314 13.657 18
PER Recoleta 11.185 4.785 6.365 18.968 18
PER UADEN 9.710 5.481 5.112 18.76 18
PER Stocks 8.601 2.004 3.789 12.956 18
PER Bonds 7.348 3.421 1.655 12.62 16
Brazil
PER SaopMun 10.428 4.131 5.099 19.281 18
PER SaopMet 9.702 3.981 4.606 18.755 18
PER Stocks 6.456 2.265 1.713 9.919 18
PER Bonds 8.877 3.313 4.497 15.434 18
Chile
PER N˜un˜oa 18.953 3.873 14.56 23.991 8
PER Santiago 15.523 3.727 10.692 20.841 8
PER Stocks 15.492 2.275 13.207 19.852 8
PER Bonds 18.597 2.373 14.835 21.72 8
Colombia
PER Bogota´ 14.322 1.72 11.329 17.026 18
PER Medellin 9.540 1.218 7.57 11.852 18
PER Cali 5.025 0.856 3.658 6.351 18
PER Stocks 13.378 4.968 8.000 23.394 18
PER Bonds 11.752 2.753 7.833 16.009 12
Mexico
PER Mexico City 12.127 1.739 9.368 15.251 18
PER Stocks 8.818 2.459 5.643 15.923 18
PER Bonds 12.811 2.81 8.598 16.87 18
Uruguay
PER Montevideo 12.566 2.672 9.963 19.276 18
PER Carretas 18.869 4.527 12.137 25.47 10
PER Rodo´ 15.392 2.488 11.517 19.433 10
PER Bonds 11.432 2.728 7.325 14.95 8
Venezuela
PER Caracas 11.793 1.297 9.445 14.18 11
PER Stocks 9.479 4.026 4.261 18.236 11
PER Bonds 7.636 2.153 4.054 12.002 11
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Table 1.2: Difference-in-differences of Price Earnings Ratios during crisis
and non-crisis periods
Non-Crisis During Crisis Difference
Treated
Mean 9.88*** 16.01*** 6.13***
Std. Dev. of Mean (0.42) (0.70) (0.83)
Number of obs. 96 32 128
Control
Mean 11.09*** 6.00*** -5.09***
Std. Dev. of Mean (0.26) (0.70) (0.97)
Number of obs. 261 20 281
Difference
Mean -1.21** 10.01*** 11.22***
Std. Dev. of Mean (0.50) (1.04) (1.28)
Number of obs. 357 52 409
The treatment period in this table was set to be 1991-1994 for Brazil and 2002-2005
for Argentina and Brazil. The treatment group is PER of real estate and the control
group are PER of stocks and bonds. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05.
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Table 1.3: Main Regressions
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
treated*after 10.12*** 9.815*** 7.884*** 7.886*** 7.890*** 10.34***
(2.580) (2.577) (2.188) (1.338) (1.324) (1.823)
treated*after1y 10.49***
(1.823)
treated*after2y 10.63***
(1.822)
treated*after3y 7.855***
(1.822)
treated*after4y 4.432**
(1.822)
treated*after5y 2.057
(1.821)
treated 0.347 -0.356 2.255*** 2.357 2.355 0.00714
(0.486) (0.601) (0.788) (1.519) (1.519) (0.722)
after -6.639*** -6.337*** -4.796*** -3.338*** -3.210*** -4.368***
(2.006) (2.008) (1.718) (0.701) (0.883) (1.582)
after1y -4.667***
(1.527)
after2y -3.033**
(1.520)
after3y -1.696
(1.523)
after4y -0.933
(1.530)
after5y -0.989
(1.522)
gdpg 0.0153 -0.00323
(0.0600) (0.0515)
Constant 10.85*** 11.55*** 7.579*** 7.514*** 7.443*** 8.346***
(0.268) (0.445) (0.762) (1.534) (1.595) (0.710)
Asset Class FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X
Macro Control X X
Lags X
Observations 409 409 409 409 409 409
R-squared 0.042 0.055 0.344 0.489 0.489 0.595
The table presents the results of regressing the Price Earnings Ratios (PER) of real estate, bonds
and stocks on the treatment variable. after is a dummy variable that takes value one for the
year when crisis starts in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. after1y is the one-year lagged version
of after, after2y lagged two years, etc... treated is a dummy variable that takes value one for
real estate. treated ∗ after is the multiplication of the two variables mentioned before and its
coefficient is the difference-in-differences estimator. treated ∗ after1y is the one period lagged
version of treated∗after, and measures the one-year lagged effect of the crisis, treated∗after2y
is the two-period lagged variable and so on. The first column correspond to a regression without
controls, the second column corresponds to a regression that includes asset class fixed effects (one
dummy variable for stocks and another one for bonds), the third column includes country fixed
effects, the fourth column includes year fixed effects, the fifth column includes GDP growth
as an additional control variable, the last column includes all previous controls plus lags for
the treatment variable. All standard errors are clustered at asset-class-country level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.4: Separate regressions for Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay
VARIABLES Argentina Brazil Uruguay
treated*after 8.055** 7.205*** 14.75***
(3.103) (2.639) (3.653)
treated*after1y 8.848*** 11.36*** 11.21***
(3.103) (2.639) (3.653)
treated*after2y 10.76*** 12.41*** 9.228**
(3.103) (2.639) (3.653)
treated*after3y 7.948** 10.20*** 5.845
(3.103) (2.639) (3.653)
treated*after4y 7.410** 2.003 3.697
(3.103) (2.639) (3.653)
treated -1.177 -1.211 -0.683
(0.993) (0.823) (1.715)
after -6.092** -4.295** -5.974*
(2.407) (1.866) (3.226)
after1y -4.873** -4.796** -5.311
(2.407) (1.866) (3.226)
after2y -3.720 -1.834 -3.280
(2.407) (1.866) (3.226)
after3y -0.619 -1.636 -0.879
(2.407) (1.866) (3.226)
after4y 1.082 -1.364 0.503
(2.407) (1.866) (3.226)
Constant 9.391*** 9.650*** 13.30***
(0.843) (0.654) (1.613)
Observations 88 72 46
R-squared 0.450 0.616 0.648
The table presents the results of regressing PER of real estate, bonds and
stocks on the treatment variables separately for three different countries.
For variable definitions refer to the previous table. The first column cor-
responds to Argentina, the second column corresponds to Brazil, and the
third column corresponds to Uruguay. The three regressions include asset
class fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 1.5: Placebo tests for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
Argentina Brazil Uruguay
-11 -2.788124 +1 -0.4196458 -1 -3.078556
(4.827537) (3.633254) ( 4.850464)
-10 1.010913 +2 -4.56033 +1 1.708978
(4.822029) (3.548587) (4.818395)
-9 -5.421131 +3 -6.37698 +2 -0.7020544
(3.773364) (3.509057) (4.840041)
-8 -3.724452 +4 -4.445596 +3 -3.198834
(3.772137) (3.534908) (4.845726)
-7 -2.770867 +5 -4.657412 +4 -.5175521
(3.753296) (3.551948) (4.885608)
-6 -4.167977 +6 -4.211577
(3.763714) (3.583083)
-5 -6.079991 +7 -1.410839
(3.758836) (3.585716)
-4 -4.665651 +8 -0.5646499
(3.774046) (3.610869)
-3 -6.399969 +9 0.1957693
(3.754982) (3.628843)
-2 -4.174267 +10 0.4583582
(3.766648) (3.636874)
-1 -3.97013 +11 -0.0251644
(3.756869) (3.620283)
+1 3.722344 +12 -1.132606
(3.593455) (3.57787)
+2 6.547424 +13 -4.025761
(3.596373) (3.515089)
+14 -2.266094
(3.56126)
Obs. 88 72 46
The table presents the results of regressing PER of real estate, bonds and
stocks on the treatment variables separately for three different countries.
Each coefficient shown in the table corresponds to a different regression where
covariates are treated, placebo and treated∗placebo, including asset class fixed
effects. The columns to the left of the coefficients represents the number of
years before(-)/after(+) the real crisis period corresponding to the placebo.
For example, the first coefficient for Argentina is a placebo 11 years before
the beginning of the real crisis (i.e. placebo for year 1991). For variable
definitions refer to table 1.3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: Regressions using forward-looking stocks PER
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated*after 8.738*** 8.522*** 7.689*** 7.566*** 7.865*** 10.24***
(1.774) (1.741) (1.400) (1.425) (1.355) (1.543)
treated*after1y 10.38***
(0.978)
treated*after2y 9.783***
(1.852)
treated*after3y 7.247***
(1.945)
treated*after4y 5.000**
(1.956)
treated*after5y 0.473
(1.590)
treated 0.277 -0.356 0.307 0.414 0.0358 -2.263
(1.080) (1.742) (1.396) (1.440) (1.520) (1.605)
after -5.260*** -5.044*** -4.584*** -2.790*** -2.564*** -3.715***
(1.258) (1.208) (0.750) (0.636) (0.666) (0.774)
after1y -4.364***
(0.950)
after2y -2.308
(1.753)
after3y -1.122
(1.992)
after4y -1.137
(1.675)
after5y -0.866
(1.377)
gdpg 0.0400 0.0210
(0.0435) (0.0230)
Constant 10.92*** 11.55*** 9.608*** 9.515*** 9.248*** 10.05***
(0.719) (1.543) (1.524) (1.547) (1.735) (1.792)
Asset Class FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X
Macro Control X X
Lags X
Observations 403 403 403 403 403 403
R-squared 0.030 0.041 0.345 0.511 0.518 0.636
The table presents the results of regressing PER of real estate, bonds and stocks on the treatment variables.
The only difference with respect to table 1.3 is that here forward-looking PER for stocks were used, instead
of PER computed with past earnings. For variable definitions refer to table 1.3. All standard errors are
clustered at asset-class level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Regressions using unlevered stocks PER
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated*after 9.873*** 9.421*** 7.775*** 7.771*** 7.779*** 10.35***
(1.762) (1.621) (1.303) (1.326) (1.301) (1.384)
treated*after1y 10.78***
(0.733)
treated*after2y 10.77***
(1.273)
treated*after3y 8.299***
(1.037)
treated*after4y 4.884***
(1.633)
treated*after5y 2.351
(1.684)
treated 0.960 -0.356 1.697 1.808 1.803 -0.663
(1.138) (1.742) (1.516) (1.566) (1.564) (1.608)
after -6.395*** -5.943*** -4.681*** -2.991*** -2.742*** -4.002***
(1.241) (1.027) (0.579) (0.575) (0.706) (0.579)
after1y -4.953***
(0.606)
after2y -3.481***
(0.978)
after3y -2.500***
(0.853)
after4y -1.636
(1.362)
after5y -1.108
(1.143)
gdpg 0.0297 0.0160
(0.0490) (0.0289)
Constant 10.24*** 11.55*** 8.307*** 8.215*** 8.077*** 9.112***
(0.805) (1.543) (1.591) (1.638) (1.723) (1.726)
Asset Class FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X
Macro Control X X
Lags X
Observations 409 409 409 409 409 409
R-squared 0.050 0.121 0.386 0.534 0.535 0.635
The table presents the results of regressing PER of real estate, bonds and stocks on the treatment variables.
The only difference with respect to table 1.3 is that here unlevered PER for stocks were used, instead of
levered PER. For variable definitions refer to table 1.3. All standard errors are clustered at asset-class
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.8: Regressions using non-stripped bonds PER
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated*after 10.09*** 9.871*** 7.988*** 7.986*** 7.990*** 10.50***
(1.675) (1.609) (1.268) (1.315) (1.303) (1.384)
treated*after1y 10.66***
(0.840)
treated*after2y 10.79***
(1.281)
treated*after3y 7.999***
(1.112)
treated*after4y 4.587***
(1.642)
treated*after5y 2.208
(1.561)
treated 0.249 -0.356 2.162 2.264 2.262 -0.139
(1.100) (1.742) (1.450) (1.504) (1.504) (1.527)
after -6.607*** -6.392*** -4.893*** -3.437*** -3.332*** -4.529***
(1.113) (1.007) (0.497) (0.644) (0.843) (0.687)
after1y -4.821***
(0.755)
after2y -3.166***
(1.022)
after3y -1.802*
(1.001)
after4y -1.053
(1.431)
after5y -1.109
(1.053)
gdpg 0.0125 -0.00568
(0.0600) (0.0436)
Constant 10.95*** 11.55*** 7.718*** 7.649*** 7.591*** 8.535***
(0.749) (1.543) (1.445) (1.506) (1.573) (1.558)
Asset Class FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X
Macro Control X X
Lags X
Observations 409 409 409 409 409 409
R-squared 0.041 0.056 0.340 0.483 0.483 0.593
The table presents the results of regressing PER of real estate, bonds and stocks on the treatment variables.
The only difference with respect to table 1.3 is that here non-stripped PER for bonds were used, instead
of stripped PER. For variable definitions refer to table 1.3. All standard errors are clustered at asset-class
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.1: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Argentina
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Figure 1.2: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Brazil
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Figure 1.3: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Uruguay
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Figure 1.4: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Colombia
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Figure 1.5: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Mexico
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Figure 1.6: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Venezuela
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Figure 1.7: Price Earnings Ratios of different assets in Chile
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Figure 1.8: Value of the Stocks Traded as a % of GDP
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Source: World Bank.
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Figure 1.9: Prices and Rental Prices for real estate in Argentina (percentage change)
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Figure 1.10: Prices and Rental Prices for real estate in Brazil (percentage change)
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Figure 1.11: Prices and Rental Prices for real estate in Uruguay (percentage change)
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Figure 1.12: FDI in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (in millions of USD)
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Figure 1.13: FDI as a percentage of GDP in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
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CHAPTER 2: AN ASSET-PRICING MODEL WITH
RESILIENCY TO ECONOMIC DISASTERS
1. Introduction
In the first chapter it was found that the economic crises occurred in Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay have increased the relative price of real estate significantly with respect
to other asset classes such as sovereign bonds and stocks. However, the Difference-in-
Difference analysis implemented in that paper does not provide a theoretical explanation
of the channel through which economic crises affect real estate prices. The main purpose
of this article is to derive a model that uses the notion of resiliency to economic disasters
to explain the empirical observation of a widening in the gap between the Price Earnings
Ratio (PER) of resilient (real estate) and non-resilient (stocks, bonds) assets during times
of instability. The argument behind this idea is that during crises there is a capital flight
towards real estate due to a higher resiliency perceived by investors on this asset class, and
this phenomenon increases the PER of real estate.
The research questions addressed in this paper are the following: Why the gap between
the PER of real estate and stocks/bonds increases after an economic disaster? What is
the theoretical explanation behind this phenomenon? Is the asset’s resiliency to economic
disasters capable of explaining the increase in the PER gap after the beginning of a cri-
sis? The present paper argues that in some Latin American countries, when confidence in
sovereign bonds (hereafter called bonds), stocks and banks is lost, investors perceive real
estate as a safer asset in terms of a higher resiliency of their prices with respect to market
conditions. Because of this, after an economic disaster, there is a capital flight to real
estate that generates an increase in the relative price paid for holding real estate compared
to riskier assets like bonds and stocks. This price premium was measured in the present
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paper as the difference between the Price Earnings Ratio (PER) of real estate and the PER
of other assets. The PER represents the price paid per dollar of annual earnings obtained
from an asset. This concept is very familiar when referring to stocks, and a very similar
reasoning can be applied to real estate and bonds. For real estate, the PER is the price
paid per dollar that was earned from rent, and for bonds is the price paid per dollar that
came from bond payments (reciprocal of the bond yield).
The notion of disaster risk refers to the possibility of a large decline in the GDP and was
previously incorporated in other asset pricing models, such as Gabaix (2012). In developed
countries where sovereign default is very unusual (or nonexistent) the difference between the
short-term and long-term bond yields during times of crisis is explained by the possibility
of a jump in inflation, which has a greater detrimental effect on long-term bonds. Gabaix
(2012) calls this inflation effect on bonds “default via inflation”. This author develops a
theoretical model that introduces the notion of disaster risk in order to explain the upward-
slope the yield curve shows during economic crises. In other words, the upward-slope of
the nominal yield curve is a consequence of the higher risk-premium commanded in the
defaultable-via-inflation long-term bonds versus the immune-to-inflation short-term bonds.
This means that bond premiums are proportional to bond maturity, a result previously
found by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). Besides short-term bonds, there are also other
resilient assets in Gabaix (2012), and a similar phenomenon occurs: the disaster generates
a flight to safety that increases the PER of those assets that are more immune to the
adverse shock.
As an example of the argument explained in the previous paragraph for United States,
figure 2.1 shows the PER of long-term bonds (20 years treasury bonds), short-tem bonds
(1 year treasury bonds) and stocks during the period 1991-2007. It can be observed that
after the dot-com crash, in the beginning of the 2000’s, there is a flight to safety effect
that makes the PER of more resilient assets (in this case short-term bonds) to increase
significantly with respect to stocks and defaultable-via-inflation long-term bonds.
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In developing countries the same phenomenon has some relevant differences. Since
many emerging countries have defaulted on their sovereign debt in the past, investors have
to bear not only risk of “default-via-inflation” but also risk of plain default, which means
that there are usually no short-term risk free bonds in these economies. The possibility
of a default makes all sovereign bonds risky, especially in times of instability. In addition,
not even bank deposits are free from expropriation since deposit freezes happened several
times in the past in many of these countries, with substantial looses for investors (Moody’s
2008). However, there are alternative investment instruments that are considered safer
by investors during a crisis, precisely investment in real estate. In this sense, Auguste,
Bebczuk and Moya (2011) suggest that instability and violation of financial property rights
in Argentina have increased demand for real estate as an investment. Also Bebczuk and
Garegnani (2012) used an Equilibrium Correction Model to provide evidence that supports
the idea that real estate fulfills a prominent role as a financial investment in Argentina,
particularly in times when investors lose confidence in the banking system.
Recently in the finance literature, there has been in a comeback to the Rietz (1988)
idea that economic disasters determine risk premiums. Barro and Ursua (2008) identi-
fied several economic disasters in a panel of countries since 1870. Longstaff and Piazzesi
(2004), Veronesi (2004), Weitzman (2007), Wachter (2009), Gabaix (2012) and Gourio
(2012) developed theoretical models that incorporate the possibility of economic disaster
to explain several puzzles in finance, such as: Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott
1985), Risk-free rate puzzle (Weil 1990), Credit spread puzzle (Almeida and Philippon
2007) and Yield curve slope Puzzle (Campbell 2003), among others. Empirical papers such
as Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011) found evidence that support the theoretical results
of time-variable disaster risk models, showing that during episodes of high crisis risk the
stocks PER decreases.
Economic disasters trigger a flight to quality phenomenon, and without a safe alternative
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in bonds it is reasonable to expect that capital goes towards safer assets like real estate1.
In the same fashion the flight to quality in developed countries raises the spread between
the yields of risky long-term and safer short-term bonds, in emerging countries it increases
the spread between the yields of risky assets (like bonds and stocks) and real estate. The
Price Earnings Ratio (PER) of an asset is the reciprocal of the yield and it measures the
price investors are willing to pay per dollar of annual earnings, so the increase in the PER
gap implies that during instability investors are willing to increase the price they pay per
dollar of annual earnings in real estate relative to other assets.
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical asset-pricing model that incorpo-
rates the notion of resiliency to economic disasters in order to explain the observed behavior
of asset’s PER during crises. This disaster risk model with heterogeneous asset resiliency
was calibrated with data from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and it was able to match
the risk premium of each asset class and predict correctly the evolution of the asset’s PER
after an increase in the probability of disaster.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical asset-pricing model
with disaster risk is explained in section 2. Section 3 contains the description of the data
used in the model calibration. Section 4 presents the results obtained from calibrating the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical Model
The objective of this section is to provide a theoretical model that explains the behavior
of the Price Earnings Ratio and Risk Premium of assets with different levels of resiliency
to economic disasters. Barro (2009) develops a disaster risk model that assumes dividend
growth follow exactly the same random process as GDP growth. In the present paper,
1Another popular investment in developing countries during times of crisis is buying dollars. Since real
estate properties are usually valued in dollars in these economies, real estate is also a market that receives
capital from investors that want to be invested in this currency.
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the Barro (2009) model is generalized to admit the possibility of dividend processes with
different degrees of resiliency to economic disasters. The asset resiliency is represented in
the model by the parameter λi (an asset-specific parameter), and the Barro (2009) model
would be a particular case where λi = 1 for every asset.
2.1 Basic Pricing Equation
The model is based on a standard Lucas (1978) tree endowment economy with a repre-
sentative consumer. Let’s start by obtaining the basic pricing (Euler) equation. Following
Cochrane (2001), consider a consumer that obtains utility from today’s consumption and
the discounted value of the expectation of tomorrow’s consumption as follows,
u(Ct) + βEt(u(Ct+1)) (5)
where u has standard properties such as being increasing, concave and satisfying lim→0u′(c) =
∞, and β ≡ 1
(1+ρ)
is the subjective discount factor that captures the impatience rate ρ.
Now assume the consumer has some particular starting endowment denoted by e and can
buy (or sell) ξ shares of an asset with price P that will provide a random payoff X in the
next period. The maximization problem for this consumer is represented by,
max
ξ
u(Ct) + βEt(u(Ct+1)) s.t.
Ct = et − Ptξ
Ct+1 = et+1 +Xt+1ξ
(6)
replacing the two constraints into the objective function and setting the derivative with
respect to ξ equal to zero, the following Euler equation is obtained,
Ptu
′(Ct) = Et[βu′(Ct+1)Xt+1] (7)
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which can be reexpressed as,
Pt = Et
[
β
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
Xt+1
]
(8)
The previous equation is the basic pricing equation and can be generalized defining a
stochastic discount factor (SDF), Mt+1 ≡ β u′(Ct+1)u′(Ct) , which implies that,
Pt = Et[Mt+1Xt+1]
or,
Pt = Et[Mt+1(Pt+1 +Dt+1)] (9)
where the payoff Xt+1 was decomposed into next period’s dividends Dt+1 and price Pt+1.
Dividing both sides by Dt the following expression can be obtained for the Price Divi-
dend Ratio (P/D),
Pt
Dt
= Et
[
Mt+1
( Pt+1
Dt+1
+ 1
)(Dt+1
Dt
)]
(10)
This is the formula that is going to be used to derive the implications of the model on the
P/D of different assets. For simplicity, Earnings and Dividends are used indistinctly in the
paper, assuming that the firm’s dividend policy does not have a significant effect on prices.
2.2 Process for GDP
The source of uncertainty comes from defining a random process for the GDP, denoted
by Yt. In the setup of lucas-tree endowment closed economy with fixed amount of trees
and without government expenditures, consumption is identical to GDP, so Yt = Ct. The
log of GDP follows a random walk with drift, which has the key feature of being iid and is
defined as,
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log Yt+1 = log Yt + g + ut+1 + vt+1 (11)
where ut+1 ∼ N(0, σ2) and represents the normal-times shock on growth. The constant g
represents the constant and exogenous part of GDP growth. The variable vt+1 represents
the disaster risk as in Rietz (1988), and Barro (2006, 2008 and 2009). The distribution of
this random variable is the following,
vt+1 =

0 with probability 1-p.
log(1− b) with probability p.
(12)
This distribution means that disasters happen with probability p and they are characterized
by a contraction in output by the fraction b, where 0 < b < 1 is a random variable that
is unknown before disaster happens. For example, if b = 0.2 then consumption drops by
20% when a disaster happens. The distribution of the disaster size b will be approximated
by its empirical distribution. Notice that consumption shocks are not symmetrical in the
sense that they only account for rare negative disasters, and not rare bonanzas, which
due to decreasing marginal utility is much less important at determining asset prices.
Consequently, the distribution of GDP growth is not normal but negatively skewed.2
Given the process defined for Yt, the expected growth rate would be determined by,
g∗dis ≡ Et
(Ct+1
Ct
)
= eg+
1
2
σ2 [1− p Eb] (13)
where Eb is the expected size of disasters. For arbitrarily small time intervals (continuous
time) the expected growth rate would be,
g∗ ≡ g + 1
2
σ2 − p Eb (14)
2The shocks ut+1 and vt+1 represent permanent (not transitory) shocks, for a model that reverts to a
deterministic trend see Cochrane (1988). However, it is shown in Barro (2009) that the empirical evidence
in US is not consistent with a model that presents a deterministic fixed trend.
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It can be observed that the expected growth decreases with the probability and expected
size of disasters.
2.3 Process for Dividends
In Barro (2009) dividend growth is assumed to be equal to GDP growth, but here the
concept of asset’s resilience is introduced by defining heterogeneous assets with different
stochastic processes for their dividends,
logDt+1,i = logDt,i + g + ut+1 + λivt+1 (15)
where i represents different assets and λi is an asset-specific parameter that represents the
resiliency of dividends to disaster shocks. Notice that this is the same process as the one
defined previously for Yt, except for the difference that here the variable v is multiplied
by the constant λi. The higher the λi, the lower the resiliency (i.e. higher sensitivity to
disaster shocks). In other words, assets expected to do better in a disaster are those with
lower λi. Barro (2009) model would be a particular case of this setup, a case in which
λ = 1 for every asset.
2.4 Price Dividend Ratio with CRRA preferences
Let’s begin the derivation by using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function,
u(C) =
C1−γ
1− γ (16)
which implies the SDF is,
Mt+1 ≡ βu
′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
= β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(17)
With CRRA preferences, the previously shown P/D equation would be,
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Pt
Dt
= Et
[
β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−γ( Pt+1
Dt+1
+ 1
)(Dt+1
Dt
)]
(18)
Then substituting consumption growth Ct+1
Ct
= elogCt+1−logCt = eg+ut+1+vt+1 and dividend
growth in the same way, the P/D results to be,3
P
D
i
=
exp
[
log β − (γ − 1)g∗dis + γ(γ − 1)σ
2
2
+ log
[
1−p+p E(1−b)λi−γ
(1−pEb)γ−1
]]
1− exp
[
log β − (γ − 1)g∗dis + γ(γ − 1)σ22 + log
[
1−p+p E(1−b)λi−γ
(1−pEb)γ−1
]] (19)
where E(1 − b)λi−γ is the expectation of (1 − b)λi−γ. For arbitrarily small time intervals
the expression simplifies to,
P
D
i
=
1
ρ+ (γ − 1)g∗ − γ(γ − 1)σ2
2
− p
[
[E(1− b)λi−γ − 1− (γ − 1)Eb
] (20)
Notice that under CRRA preferences, if γ > λi (which is likely to occur for all assets,
as it is shown later) we have that the P/D increase when the probability of disaster rises.
Moreover, for a given level of g∗ any increase in uncertainty (higher p, higher σ or an
increase in the expected size of disasters Eb) will generate P/D increasing in p for γ > λi.
This constitutes a failure of this initial version of the model since in general an increase
in uncertainty tends to decrease the P/D of assets like stocks. The technical reason of
this failure in the model is that under CRRA preferences the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) is restricted to be equal to the reciprocal of the risk aversion parameter
γ. This is also a problem mentioned in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and in Barro (2006, 2008
and 2009). The failure of this initial model will be fixed using Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW)
preferences, developed in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), instead of CRRA.
3Here independence between v and u was used, as well as the following result: If ut+1 ∼ N(µ, σ2),
then Eeut+1 = eµ+
σ2
2 . Also it is necessary to use the fact that the processes for consumption growth and
dividends growth are both iid.
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2.5 Price Dividend Ratio with EZW preferences
In order to disentangle the relationship between the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution (IES) and the coefficient of risk aversion, CRRA preferences are dropped and EZW
preferences are used instead.
Under EZW preferences, the expected utility V is expressed recursively as a function
of current consumption and future levels of V ,
Vt =
[
(1− β)c1−θt + βEt(V 1−γt+1 )
1−θ
1−γ
] 1
1−θ
(21)
where γ represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion and IES=1
θ
. If γ = θ the function
converges to the previously used CRRA preferences.
The main implication of using EZW preferences is that the SDF is now determined by
the following equation,4
Mt+1 = β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ( Vt+1
(EV 1−γt+1 )
1
1−γ
)ρ−γ
(22)
Plugging this new SDF into the P/D equation (10),
P
D
i
=
eΦ
1− eΦ (23)
where,
Φ ≡ log β − (θ − 1)g∗dis + γ(θ − 1)
σ2
2
+
+ log
[(1− p+ p E(1− b)1−γ) γ−θ1−γ (1− p+ p E(1− b)λi−γ)
(1− pEb)θ−1
]
(24)
4For this result to hold it is necessary to have an iid process for consumption growth, which is the case
in this model but not in other models with probability of disaster being a random variable that depends
on the previous state of the economy.
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And for arbitrarily small time intervals,
P
D
i
=
1
ρ+ (θ − 1)g∗ − γ(θ − 1)σ2
2
− p[DRA] (25)
where the disaster risk adjustment (DRA) is defined as,
DRA ≡
[(γ − θ
1− γ
)
[E(1− b)1−γ − 1] + [E(1− b)λi−γ − 1]− (θ − 1)Eb
]
(26)
Consequently, very safe assets (i.e. resilient, low λi) present an increase in their P/D
when the probability of disaster increases, which corresponds to a flight to safety phe-
nomenon. Riskier assets (i.e. high λi) would show a drop in their P/D for higher values of
p (or constant P/D for intermediate values of λi). This result implies that when disasters
are more likely to occur the gap between the PER of safe and risky assets gets wider. This
gap represents the additional price investors are willing to pay for holding resilient assets
versus riskier ones during times of instability.
2.6 Stocks and Real Estate risk premiums with EZW preferences
From the basic pricing equation obtained before it is also derived the risk free rate rf
with EZW preferences allowing for the possibility of disasters,
1
RF
= elog β−θg
∗
dis+γ(θ+1)
σ2
2 ×
×
[(1− p+ p E(1− b)1−γ) γ−θ1−γ (1− p+ p E(1− b)−γ)
(1− pEb)−θ
]
(27)
And for arbitrarily small time intervals, defining log[Rf ] ≡ rf ,
rf = ρ+ θg
∗ − γ(θ + 1)σ
2
2
− p
[(γ − θ
1− γ
)
[E(1− b)1−γ − 1] + [E(1− b)−γ − 1]− θEb
]
(28)
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A particular case obtained from the previous equation is the risk free rate under CRRA
preferences, where γ = θ,
rCRRAf = ρ+ θg
∗ − γ(θ + 1)σ
2
2
− p
[
E(1− b)−γ − 1− θEb
]
(29)
Looking at equation (28) the reason behind the failure of the CRRA model becomes more
clear. Since the last term in the equation is negative and relatively important in magnitude,
when p increases, the risk free rate decreases so much that the discounted value of assets
may increase. With EZW preferences the term γ−θ
1−γ is negative for reasonable parameters
calibrations (like γ > 1, and θ < 1), diminishing the effect of p on the risk free rate, and
allowing the P/D ratio of assets like stocks to decrease after a rise in the probability of
disaster.
Also from the basic pricing equation the asset’s expected returns equation can be ob-
tained,
E(Ri) = e
− log β+θg∗dis−γ(θ−1)σ
2
2 × (30)
×
[
1− p+ p E(1− b)λi
(1− pEb)−θ (1− p+ p E(1− b)1−γ) γ−θ1−γ (1− p+ p E(1− b)λi−γ)
]
And for arbitrarily small time intervals, defining log[E(Ri)] ≡ ri,
ri = ρ+ θg
∗ − γ(θ − 1)σ
2
2
− (31)
−p
[
(
γ − θ
1− γ )[E(1− b)
1−γ − 1]− [E(1− b)λi − 1] + [E(1− b)λi−γ − 1]− θEb
]
Subtracting the risk free rate from the asset’s return, the equity premium is,
ri − rf = γσ2 + pE
[
(1− b)−γ − (1− b)λi [(1− b)−γ − 1]− 1
]
(32)
Since 0 < (1 − b) < 1, the risk premium is higher for assets with higher levels of λi
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(non-resilient). For resilient assets like real estate the risk premium is low relative to riskier
assets like stocks. Notice that as a special case, when λi = 1 the previous equation is the
Barro (2009) equity premium,
r(λi=1) − rf = γσ2 + pE
[
b[(1− b)−γ − 1]
]
(33)
2.7 Defaultable bond premium with EZW preferences
Now let’s consider a one period zero-coupon bond that is defaulted during disasters
with probability q. If the bond is defaulted it pays the recovery rate r, otherwise it pays
1. It is assumed that this bond can only be defaulted when a disaster happens. The payoff
structure of this asset conditional on disasters is summarized in the following diagram:
PAY OFF =

1 with probability 1-q
r with probability q
(34)
The basic asset pricing equation for the defaultable bond (denoted db) would be,
P dbt = Et[Mt+1Payofft+1] (35)
Replacing the SDF with EZW preferences and the payoff function, the price of this
asset is obtained,
P dbt = e
logβ−ρg+(γ−ρ(1−γ))σ2
[
1− p+ p E(1− b)1−γ
] γ−θ
1−γ ×
×
[
1− p+ p(1− q) E(1− b)−γ + pqrE(1− b)−γ
]
(36)
The expected return on the defaultable bonds is then,
Et(R
db
t+1) =
(1− p) 1 + p(1− q) 1 + pq r
P dbt
(37)
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And for arbitrarily small time intervals, defining logE[Rdb] ≡ rdb,
rdb = ρ+ θg
∗ − γ(θ + 1)σ
2
2
− (38)
−p
[(γ − θ
1− γ
)
[E(1− b)1−γ − 1] + (1− q(1− r))[E(1− b)−γ − 1]− θEb
]
Notice that when q = 0 (default not possible) and/or r = 1 (full recovery), the previous
equation is exactly the risk free rate of return rf derived previously. The defaultable bond
PER used in the following sections of the paper is defined to be the 1/rdb (reciprocal of the
bond yield).
Subtracting the risk free rate from the bond expected return, the risk premium for
defaultable bonds is obtained,
rdb − rf = pq(1− r)[E(1− b)−γ − 1] (39)
Notice that the defaultable bond risk premium is increasing in p, q and (1− r). Also when
q = 0 and/or r = 1, the premium is zero for any value of p.
3. Data
3.1 Real Estate PER
In order to construct the PER of real estate, it was necessary first to obtain an annual
series of prices per square meter for each country during the analyzed period. Currently
there is no public information on real estate prices on a historical basis, and the database
used in this paper is the first one that has comparable prices on real estate among Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay. One important feature shared by countries included in the sample is
that they are all developing countries that have experienced large declines in GDP, sovereign
defaults and deposit freezes in the past, generating a subsequent loss of confidence in the
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traditional financial sector.
The first real estate price index for Argentina was obtained from the Economic Institute
of UADE University, which collected offer prices of apartments located in the north side of
Buenos Aires City posted in newspaper advertisements. This index corresponds to average
monthly prices in dollars, and they were transformed to annual average prices assuming a
base value that was obtained from market data. The reason why this monthly data was
converted to annual was to be able to compare it with all the rest of the real estate prices
time series from other countries, which were obtained in an annual basis. Other two series
were obtained from one of the largest real estate agencies in the country; one of them refers
to real estate properties located in a neighborhood called Caballito, and the other one to
real estate in the neighborhood of Recoleta. These last two series were expressed in annual
average prices in dollars per square meter.
Two real estate price series for Brazil were obtained from Empresa Brasileira de Estudos
de Patrimonio (EMBRAESP). One of them corresponds to Metropolitan Area of Sa˜o Paulo
and the other one to a broader area called Municipio de Sa˜o Paulo. Both series were
expressed in annual average prices per square meter in dollars.
In Uruguay, the National Statistics Institute of Uruguay (INE) provided a series of
annual average transaction prices in dollars per square meter of dwellings in Montevideo,
for the period 1999-2008. Information was available on different neighborhoods, from which
three of the most populars were used. In order to cover the period 1991-2008 two series
obtained from two different real estate consulting firms in Montevideo were linked.
Some important limitations of the data obtained on real estate prices are that it be-
longs to metropolitan areas and most of it constitutes offer prices (not transaction prices).
Moreover, since real estate indexes were constructed as an average of offer prices, they do
not reflect possible changes in the quality of the units sold nor changes in the neighbor-
hoods were most of the houses were sold. In order to adjust for these changes in quality
it would be necessary to obtain data on all the prices at which each single unit was sold
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throughout the sample period, along with its main characteristics and improvements, and
use this information to construct a Case-Shiller Repeated Sales Index. Unfortunately, real
estate data is very scarce in these countries and such information is not available.
The second piece of data needed to construct a Price Earnings Ratio for real estate
is the earnings or rental prices. Fortunately, the information on these indexes is usually
available since one of the components of the Consumer Price Index is the expenditure on
dwelling rent. Indexes on rental prices were provided by national institutions of statistics in
each country. In Argentina the index was obtained from the National Institute of Statistics
(INDEC) and corresponds to the district of Gran Buenos Aires, in Brazil from the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) corresponding to Sa˜o Paulo and in Uruguay
from National Institute of Statistics (INE) corresponding to a national index. The monthly
rental price indexes were in local currency and were converted into dollar prices at each
month using market data for a base year and the corresponding exchange rates at the end
of each month.
The limitation of the data in this aspect is that it is not possible to construct one series
of rental prices for each neighborhood within a country because there is not rental prices
data specific to different neighborhoods. Consequently the same series of rental prices was
used to construct the series of real estate PER in different neighborhoods within a country.
3.2 Bonds PER
The PER for bonds is defined to be the reciprocal of the yield to maturity. These PER
were constructed from the yield to maturity of the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond
Index Global (EMBIG) of each country.
The EMBIG index begins in 1993 for Argentina and in 1994 for Brazil. These countries
have also a very similar index for the rest of the years until 1991, the Emerging Market
Bond Index (EMBI), which was used to extend the series until 1991. In the case of Uruguay,
bond yields are only available since 2001.
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Most of these countries offered some kind of collateral (usually US Treasury Bonds) to
their bonds at some point in the sample period, because of that JP Morgan also computes
the yields of their Bonds after subtracting the value of the collateral, so as the yields can
be comparable across time and across countries. This is called stripped yield, and is the
one that was used in this analysis.
3.3 Stocks PER
The stocks PER were computed using the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL database. This
database is composed of data on non-US public firms, including Argentina and Brazil.
Uruguay does not have enough public firms data so the stocks PER for this particular
country were not computed.
One problem that arises at computing the PER for a set of firms within a country is
that firm’s earnings may be negative or close to zero, so taking the average of firms PER
would generate an excessive influence of cases with small earnings, resulting in misleading
results. In order to avoid this problem, the approach followed consisted on computing the
sum of the firm’s market capitalizations and dividing this by the sum of the earnings of
these firms. Then, stocks PER for each quarter were constructed as the ratio of the sum
of the firm’s market capitalizations at the last day of the quarter, over the sum of the
twelve-month trailing earnings of these firms during the last four quarters. When quarterly
data was not available, annual data was used for all the quarters in the corresponding year.
Finally the annual average stocks PER was obtained by computing the average of quarterly
PER.
3.4 Disasters
The time series of GDP per capita growth rate in each country was obtained from the
GDP indexes available in Barro-Ursua Macroeconomic Data (2010). Disaster events and
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disaster sizes were taken from Barro, Ursua (2008), which also uses this database. That
study defined an economic disaster as a decline in real GDP per capita by at least 10%
over consecutive years. All of the disaster events considered in this paper are presented in
table 2.1, with their corresponding sizes.
3.5 Returns
The stock returns were obtained from the database Global Financial Data. In Argentina
the General Stock Index of Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (GSIBA) was used, and for
Brazil the BOVESPA Index. Both were adjusted by dividends and represent total returns.
Returns are in dollars and adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index constructed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the case of Brazil, BOVESPA is the most popular
index, but this may not be the case for GSIBA in Argentina. In this former country
MERVAL is currently the most popular index but it is only available since its inception in
1986. Because of this it was used GSIBA instead, which is available since 1966 and also
comprises the most relevant stocks in the country. The GSIBA is rebalanced each quarter
to include all stocks that have been traded at least in 20% of the trading days during the
last semester.
Bond total returns were also obtained from Global Financial Data. Real Estate returns
were computed using the same data that was used to compute real estate PER.
4. Results
4.1 Theoretical Model Calibration
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the evolution of stocks, bonds and real estate returns for
Argentina and Brazil. The GDP disaster events used by Barro, Ursua (2008) (shown in
table 2.1) include Argentina 1980-1982 (11%), 1988-1990 (14%), 1998-2002 (12%), and
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Brazil 1987-1992 (11%).5 It can be noticed in the graphs that for all of these disasters
real estate is the asset that presents the lowest negative returns in absolute terms. This
observation is consistent with the idea that real estate is perceived as more resilient to
disasters compared to bonds and stocks. Consequently, it would be reasonable to expect a
lower risk premium for real estate.
In table 2.2 average returns, average premiums (spreads), and risk free rates are shown
with their respective standard deviations, for stocks, bonds and real estate. Uruguayan
stocks and sovereign bonds were omitted because there is not enough data on these assets
for this particular country. Since there were no risk-free assets available in these economies,
risk premiums (i.e. spreads) were computed with respect to the risk free rate in US treasury
bills (also obtained from Global Financial Data).
In order to consider the full set of information available to the investor to compute
expected spreads for each asset, different time windows were used. For instance, EMBIG
bonds were created in 1993 while there is valuable information dated long before on the
other two assets that can be used for investors to compute expected spreads. In Argentina
it was found a stocks return of 783% in 1976, this observation was considered an outlier
and it was replaced by the second maximum level observed in the sample, which is 300%.
For real estate a depreciation rate of 1% was considered. This rate level was found to be
used in local real estate reports in these countries and seems to be conservative relative to
those used in other papers for developed countries. In US the rate used ascends to 3.6%
over the total property value, which would imply a net depreciation rate of at least 2.3%.6
In table 2.2 it can be noticed that for both Brazil and Argentina, stocks is the asset
class with highest average premiums and also with highest volatility. The second place in
average premiums is for sovereign bonds. Real estate is the asset with the lowest average
5In Barro, Ursua (2009) the drops in GDP during disasters were measured over more than one year,
more specifically from the peak year to the trough year. In this paper the highest yearly drop in GDP
during a disaster was assumed to be the trigger that increases the perceived probability of disaster.
6Davis-Heathcote (2007), have shown that on average land accounts for 36% of the property value of
houses in US, which could be considered an upper bound for land value in case of apartments.
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premiums, and this fact is going to be represented in the model based on its higher level
of perceived resiliency.
Table 2.1 presents all the disaster events with their respective sizes for the three coun-
tries since 1876, as well as the expected size of disasters E(b). It also provides the mean
and standard deviation of the GDP growth rate during non-disaster periods (g and σ re-
spectively). The model was calibrated in order to match this data as well as the spreads
shown in table 2.2. Also the table shows in the last two columns the values of some key
terms related to disaster sizes that appeared in the equations of the theoretical asset-pricing
model.
The model developed in this paper does not analyze the duration of disasters, these
events are assumed to occur in a period that lasts an instant of time. The implicit assump-
tion is that given a certain disaster size, the equity premium does not depend on whether
it is an instant shock or a shock that is spread out over time. Barro (2006) showed that
variation in the duration of disasters did not have a significant impact on the asset’s risk
premium.
The objective of the model calibration is to set the value of the parameters in such a
way that given the data on GDP growth rate, risk free rate and disaster sizes, it can explain
the risk premiums and the evolution of the PER of assets with different levels of resiliency.
Three different calibrations were done in this article. The first one is a calibration for the
set of the three countries that experienced an economic disaster during 1990-2008, which
jointly takes into account the available data from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The
other two calibrations correspond to Argentina and Brazil considered individually.
Barro, Ursua (2008) presents the data on GDP disasters in these three countries. Ac-
cording to them, from 1876 to 2008 there were 9 disasters in Argentina, 5 in Brazil and
12 in Uruguay. This implies a historical probability of disaster of about 0.065 (26 events
in 133×3 country-years). The baseline calibration considers this historical probability of
disaster and a standard value of θ = 0.5 following Gruber (2006).
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4.2 Calibrated Model Results
Table 2.3 shows the results of the model calibration for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
The table compares the baseline calibration (column 2) with alternative calibrations (columns
3 to 6) and also with a scenario where the probability of disaster is zero (column 1).
Column 2 of table 2.3 shows the results of the baseline calibration. The values of the
parameters necessary to match the data are in a reasonable range, similar to Barro (2009),
except for the risk aversion coefficient (and consequently ρ in order to match the risk free
rate), which is relatively high compared to a value of 4 in Barro (2009). It seems to be
reasonable that agents in this set of Latin American countries are more risk averse, since
they have experienced far more episodes of disasters compared to investors in developed
countries. Figure 2.4 shows the implications of choosing different levels of λ on the asset’s
PER and risk premium. As it is expected the more resilient the asset (lower λ), the higher
the PER and the lower the risk premium. Under the baseline selection of parameters the
highest risk premium the model can generate is close to 50% and the lowest PER is close to
2. A value of λre (real estate) significantly lower than one means that real estate is resilient
to disaster shocks, and λs (stocks) higher than one implies that stocks amplify the negative
effect of the disaster. Agents are willing to pay more per dollar of annual earnings earned
in real estate (16.4 U$D) since this asset class provides some protection against disasters,
an event that may happen since p > 0. On the other extreme, they are willing to pay a
smaller amount (5.2 U$D) per dollar of annual earnings obtained in stocks, because this
asset class is more sensitive to disaster shocks. In a midpoint between these two assets are
the defaultable bonds, which are considered to be safer than stocks and riskier than real
estate. It is worthwhile to mention that the differences in the PER among these assets are
based on the matched observed differences in the risk premiums presented in table 2.2.
Column 1 of table 2.3 presents the results of the model for a scenario where disasters
are considered to be impossible (and consequently so are defaults). All parameters but
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p were held constant with respect to the baseline calibration. One implication is that
when p = 0 stocks and real estate present identical expected premiums and PER. Since
disaster is not possible under this scenario, the resiliency of real estate is not priced by the
agents. However, these two assets are still vulnerable to the normal shocks of the economy
represented by the parameter σ, and because of this reason agents require a premium to
hold them. Defaultable bonds become risk free bonds when p = 0 and consequently the risk
premium is zero. More importantly, it should be noticed how the gap in PER between real
estate and stock/bonds gets wider as p increases (from column 1 to column 2). This last
point could be seen also comparing columns 2 and 3, where p increases to 0.5 and all the
rest of the parameters are held constant with respect to the baseline. Intuitively a rise in
p creates a flight to quality where households shift their capital towards the most resilient
asset, increasing then the relative price (or PER) of real estate with respect to stocks and
bonds. Also notice that as p increases the expected returns for stocks increase but the
expected return of real estate decreases, meaning that as the disaster becomes more likely
the agents demand higher compensation for holding stocks and a lower compensation for
holding safer assets like real estate.
The results of the calibration are sensitive to the value chosen for the risk aversion
parameter γ. Column 4 presents the results of the model when γ = 8 and the rest of
the parameters are held constant with respect to the baseline calibration. The generated
premiums of all the three assets are lower than those observed empirically. Also it can
be noticed that when γ is lower, the PER of real estate and stocks become closer to each
other, since real estate resiliency is a feature that has a lower value for agents that are less
risk averse.
Column 5 shows the results of the calibration for low values of the default probability
under disasters (q). The rest of the parameters were held constant with respect to the
baseline calibration. A lower value of q means that bonds are more resilient to disasters,
since they are less likely to default under that scenario. Because of this, the expected return
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for holding bonds decrease and the relative price households are willing to pay for them
(PER) increase with respect to the baseline calibration.
Column 6 presents the results of the calibration for low values of the rate of time
preference ρ. The rest of the parameters were held constant with respect to the baseline
calibration. As it can be observed, the expected returns of stocks, bonds and real estate
are affected by changes in ρ, but the risk premiums are not. In fact, with low ρ the model
generates a risk free rate lower than what is empirically observed. Also it can be noticed
that as ρ decreases, the PER of all three asset classes increase with respect to the baseline,
since agents are now more patient and consequently they are willing to wait more time to
recover their investment.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of the model calibration for Argentina and for Brazil
considering them individually instead of as a group of countries. Table 2.4 matches the
data from Argentina ignoring all data from Brazil and Uruguay. The same idea applies in
table 2.5 for Brazil. As it can be observed, results are similar to those obtained for the
group of all three countries. The most important result is that as p increases, the gap
between the PER of real estate and stock/bonds gets wider. As it was found in table 2.3,
these results are also sensitive to the choice of the risk aversion parameter, the expected
return on defaultable bonds is lower for low values of q, and the risk free rate is lower than
the empirical one for low values of ρ.
An interesting exercise that can be done with the individual country calibrations is to
simulate a scenario in which the probability of disaster increases significantly and after that
gradually decreases towards zero. The implications of the model (calibrated for the baseline
parameters in each country) for this simulation exercise in terms of the asset’s PER are
shown in figures 2.5 to 2.7, for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay respectively. The differences
among the three graphs are based on different data on GDP growth, disaster sizes, and
levels of λ chosen for the assets in each of these countries. It can be noticed that after an
increase in p the gap between the real estate PER and stocks/bonds PER gets wider. This
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gap gradually vanishes as the probability of disaster converges to zero. The evolution of
the PER implied by the model after a transitory increase in the probability of disaster is
consistent with the empirical data shown in figures 2.8 to 2.10 for these countries.
5. Conclusion
This article provides theoretical support for the idea that in countries that have expe-
rienced economic disasters with sovereign default and deposit freezes real estate assets are
perceived as more resilient compared to stocks and sovereign bonds.
In the first chapter of this dissertation it was shown that real estate presents significantly
higher PER after the beginning of a crisis compared to stocks and sovereign bonds. This
result implies that during times of instability investors are willing to pay a price premium for
holding real estate instead of stocks and sovereign bonds. The argument behind this finding
is that during crises there is a capital flight towards real estate due to a higher resiliency
perceived by investors on this asset class. The contribution of this second chapter is to
develop a theoretical asset-pricing model that uses the notions of disaster risk and asset
resiliency to explain this behavior.
The theoretical model was calibrated using data on real estate, stocks and sovereign
bonds from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay considered as a region and also for Argentina
and Brazil considered separately. The calibrated model was able to match the risk premium
of each asset class and predict correctly the heterogeneous evolution of the asset’s PER after
an increase in the probability of disaster.
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6. Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Disaster sizes and normal-times growth rate
Disaster Decline in GDP
Period per capita (b) g σ E(b) E(1− b)1−γ E(1− b)−γ
Argentina
1889-1891 0.189 0.033 0.055 0.179 4.605 5.855
1896-1897 0.219
1899-1900 0.147
1912-1917 0.289
1929-1932 0.195
1958-1959 0.101
1980-1982 0.111
1988-1990 0.141
1998-2002 0.220
Brazil
1884-1887 0.105 0.028 0.041 0.163 10.4 13.323
1891-1893 0.262
1895-1900 0.135
1928-1931 0.201
1987-1992 0.110
Uruguay
1878-1881 0.153 0.043 0.052 0.187 4.356 5.85
1886-1887 0.140
1888-1890 0.202
1896-1901 0.156
1904-1905 0.122
1912-1915 0.280
1919-1920 0.142
1930-1933 0.367
1939-1943 0.139
1957-1959 0.118
1981-1984 0.236
1998-2002 0.186
All 0.034 0.050 0.179 6.694 8.94
Source: Barro, Ursua (2008) for Declines in GDP per capita and own computations for the rest of the
variables. The second column shows the disaster size corresponding to each period in each country. The
third and fourth columns show respectively the mean and standard deviation of the growth rate in non-
disaster periods for each country. The fifth column shows the average disaster size for each country. The
last two columns show the value of two key terms in the computation of the interest rate, returns and P/E
for the values of γ used in the calibration. In the general calibration γ = 9, and in the individual-country
calibrations it was used γ = 8 for Argentina, γ = 12 for Brazil, and γ = 7 for Uruguay.
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Table 2.2: Average returns and spreads for different asset classes in Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay
Asset Time Period Return US T-Bill Spread
Argentina
Stocks 1967-2012 0.169 (0.789) 0.011 (0.024) 0.158 (0.791)
Bonds 1994-2012 0.071 (0.424) 0.006 (0.020) 0.065 (0.429)
Real Estate 1981-2008 0.076 (0.278) 0.023 (0.021) 0.053 (0.287)
Brazil
Stocks 1955-2012 0.226 (0.635) 0.011 (0.022) 0.215 (0.633)
Bonds 1994-2012 0.117 (0.006) 0.006 (0.020) 0.111 (0.188)
Real Estate 1980-2008 0.114 (0.256) 0.022 (0.021) 0.092 (0.259)
Uruguay
Real Estate 1988-2008 0.079 (0.127) 0.015 (0.015) 0.064 (0.128)
All
Stocks 1955-2012 0.201 (0.704) 0.011 (0.023) 0.190 (0.704)
Bonds 1994-2012 0.094 (0.323) 0.006 (0.020) 0.088 (0.328)
Real Estate 1980-2008 0.091 (0.235) 0.020 (0.020) 0.071 (0.240)
Source: Global Financial Data. Spreads were computed with respect to the total return obtained
in US government bills for the period. Standard Deviations of each variable in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Results from the Model Calibration for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Baseline High Low Low Low
Disaster p γ q ρ
Parameters
γ (relative risk aversion) 9 9 9 8 9 9
θ (reciprocal of IES) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
σ (condit. s.d. of growth) 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
ρ (rate of time preference) 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.068
g (exogenous growth rate) 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
p (disaster probability) 0 0.065 0.08 0.065 0.065 0.065
q (def. prob. in disaster) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5
r (bond recovery rate) 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
λs (stocks sensitivity) 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31
λre (real estate sensitivity) 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Variables
Risk free rate 0.145 0.022 -0.006 0.061 0.022 0.012
Expected growth rate (g*) 0.036 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.024
Expected Stocks Premium 0.022 0.190 0.228 0.136 0.190 0.190
Expected Bond Premium 0 0.088 0.108 0.063 0.070 0.088
Exp. Real Estate Premium 0.022 0.070 0.081 0.053 0.070 0.070
Expected Stocks Return 0.167 0.212 0.222 0.197 0.212 0.202
Expected Bond Return 0.145 0.110 0.102 0.124 0.092 0.100
Exp. Real Estate Return 0.167 0.092 0.075 0.114 0.092 0.082
Stocks P/E 7.6 5.2 4.9 5.7 5.2 5.5
Bond P/E 6.9 9.07 9.8 8.1 10.8 10
Real Estate P/E 7.6 16.4 22.4 12.1 16.4 19.6
Each column shows different configurations of the set of parameters (top panel) and the resulting values of
the model variables (bottom panel) for the set of countries. The first column shows the results when disasters
are not possible, the second column shows the results of the baseline calibrations and the following columns
provides the results of alternative calibrations where the value of one parameter was changed with respect
to the baseline. The risk free rate was computed using equation 28. The expected growth rate corresponds
to equation 14. The Expected Stocks Return and Expected Real Estate Return correspond to equation 31,
setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Expected Bond Return corresponds to equation
38. The Expected Premiums are computed with respect to the risk free rate, and correspond to equation 32
(for Stocks and Real Estate) and equation 39 (for Bonds). The Stocks P/E and Real Estate P/E correspond
to equation 25, setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Bond P/E is computed as the
reciprocal of the bond yield which corresponds to equation 38.
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Table 2.4: Results from the Model Calibration for Argentina
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Baseline High Low Low Low
Disaster p γ q ρ
Parameters
γ (relative risk aversion) 8 8 8 7 8 8
θ (reciprocal of IES) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
σ (condit. s.d. of growth) 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
ρ (rate of time preference) 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.081
g (exogenous growth rate) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
p (disaster probability) 0 0.068 0.07 0.068 0.068 0.068
q (def. prob. in disaster) 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.34 0.44
r (bond recovery rate) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
λs (stocks sensitivity) 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12
λre (real estate sensitivity) 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Variables
Risk free rate 0.090 0.023 0.020 0.042 0.023 0.013
Expected growth rate (g*) 0.034 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Expected Stocks Premium 0.024 0.158 0.163 0.119 0.158 0.158
Expected Bond Premium 0 0.064 0.066 0.047 0.049 0.064
Exp. Real Estate Premium 0.024 0.054 0.055 0.043 0.054 0.054
Expected Stocks Return 0.114 0.181 0.183 0.161 0.181 0.171
Expected Bond Return 0.090 0.087 0.086 0.089 0.072 0.077
Exp. Real Estate Return 0.114 0.077 0.075 0.085 0.077 0.067
Stocks P/E 12.5 5.9 5.8 6.7 5.9 6.3
Bond P/E 11.1 11.5 11.5 11.2 13.9 13
Real Estate P/E 12.5 21.4 22 18.2 21.4 27.3
Each column shows different configurations of the set of parameters (top panel) and the resulting values of
the model variables (bottom panel) for Argentina. The first column shows the results when disasters are
not possible, the second column shows the results of the baseline calibrations and the following columns
provides the results of alternative calibrations where the value of one parameter was changed with respect
to the baseline. The risk free rate was computed using equation 28. The expected growth rate corresponds
to equation 14. The Expected Stocks Return and Expected Real Estate Return correspond to equation 31,
setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Expected Bond Return corresponds to equation
38. The Expected Premiums are computed with respect to the risk free rate, and correspond to equation 32
(for Stocks and Real Estate) and equation 39 (for Bonds). The Stocks P/E and Real Estate P/E correspond
to equation 25, setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Bond P/E is computed as the
reciprocal of the bond yield which corresponds to equation 38.
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Table 2.5: Results from the Model Calibration for Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Baseline High Low Low Low
Disaster p γ q ρ
Parameters
γ (relative risk aversion) 12 12 12 11 12 12
θ (reciprocal of IES) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
σ (condit. s.d. of growth) 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
ρ (rate of time preference) 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.106
g (exogenous growth rate) 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
p (disaster probability) 0 0.038 0.12 0.038 0.038 0.038
q (def. prob. in disaster) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
r (bond recovery rate) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
λs (stocks sensitivity) 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17
λre (real estate sensitivity) 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Variables
Risk free rate 0.115 0.021 -0.135 0.045 0.021 0.011
Expected growth rate (g*) 0.028 0.022 0.012 0.022 0.022 0.022
Expected Stocks Premium 0.020 0.215 0.538 0.165 0.215 0.215
Expected Bond Premium 0 0.111 0.296 0.084 0.093 0.111
Exp. Real Estate Premium 0.020 0.092 0.211 0.072 0.092 0.092
Expected Stocks Return 0.135 0.236 0.403 0.210 0.236 0.226
Expected Bond Return 0.115 0.132 0.161 0.129 0.114 0.122
Exp. Real Estate Return 0.135 0.113 0.076 0.117 0.113 0.103
Stocks P/E 9.4 4.6 2.1 5.1 4.6 4.8
Bond P/E 8.7 7.6 5.9 7.7 8.8 8.2
Real Estate P/E 9.4 11.3 20.3 10.7 11.3 12.7
Each column shows different configurations of the set of parameters (top panel) and the resulting values
of the model variables (bottom panel) for Brazil. The first column shows the results when disasters are
not possible, the second column shows the results of the baseline calibrations and the following columns
provides the results of alternative calibrations where the value of one parameter was changed with respect
to the baseline. The risk free rate was computed using equation 28. The expected growth rate corresponds
to equation 14. The Expected Stocks Return and Expected Real Estate Return correspond to equation 31,
setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Expected Bond Return corresponds to equation
38. The Expected Premiums are computed with respect to the risk free rate, and correspond to equation 32
(for Stocks and Real Estate) and equation 39 (for Bonds). The Stocks P/E and Real Estate P/E correspond
to equation 25, setting different values of λi for each of these two assets. The Bond P/E is computed as the
reciprocal of the bond yield which corresponds to equation 38.
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Figure 2.1: Price Earnings Ratios of Bonds and Stocks in US
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Source: CRSP.
Figure 2.2: Returns in Argentina
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Source: Global Financial Data for Stocks and Bonds and own source for Real Estate.
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Figure 2.3: Returns in Brazil
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Source: Global Financial Data for Stocks and Bonds and own source for Real Estate.
Figure 2.4: Model simulations for assets with different levels of λ
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This graph shows the levels of P/E and Risk Premium corresponding to an asset with
different levels of λ (resiliency), assuming the parameter values from the baseline calibration
for all countries shown in table 2.3. The lower the λ (higher resiliency), the higher the P/E
and the lower the Risk Premium.
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Figure 2.5: Simulation of an increase in p in Argentina
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Figure 2.6: Simulation of an increase in p in Brazil
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Figure 2.7: Simulation of an increase in p in Uruguay
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Figures 2.5 to 2.7 show the simulation of an exogenous increase in p for each country, assuming the
parameter values corresponding to the baseline calibrations in table 2.4 and 2.5. For Uruguay it was used
γ = 7, p = 0.09 and ρ = 0.116.
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Figure 2.8: Price Earnings Ratios of real estate, stocks and bonds in Argentina
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Figure 2.9: Price Earnings Ratios of real estate, stocks and bonds in Brazil
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Figure 2.10: Price Earnings Ratios of real estate and bonds in Uruguay
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